
Maybe the British were on to something; after more than eight decades of intervention in Afghanistan, the last of their soldiers marched through the Khyber Pass into British India in 1919, leaving Afghanistan to fend for itself. Even though the British won all three wars they fought with the Afghans, they finally decided enough was enough. The only reason the British were ostensibly in Afghanistan in the first place was to check the ambitions of the Russian Empire to the north. And Russian designs toward Afghanistan wouldn’t be realized for another 60 years.
So what would happen if, after our brief nine years’ stay in Afghanistan, we decided to go the way of the British?
Plenty. Afghanistan’s government is woefully unprepared to lead its cities, much less the country as a whole. Corruption and internal strife are rampant, its police and military forces cannot guarantee adequate security, there is no infrastructure to speak of, it has no control over the flow of narcotics, and President Karzai has virtually no legitimacy among his people even though he won his last election. In addition, the Taliban are enjoying resurgence in both military strength and increased acceptance by the people, especially the majority Pashtuns. The government is often more feared by ordinary Afghans than the Taliban in some areas.
But how can we afford to stay? How long could it take to stabilize something as broken as Afghanistan?
Therein lies the rub. We don’t have enough troops to maintain security in a largely mountainous country the size of Texas; to compensate for insufficient manpower, we have resorted to using aerial strikes, which can be imprecise and indiscriminate when trying to maintain security. (It’s hard to make friends and influence people when you’ve just blown up the wrong house). We haven’t properly trained the locals to take over either, since our special operations soldiers are up in the mountains going after Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters, who often enjoy sanctuary across the Durand Line in Pakistan. Iran is meddling with Afghanistan’s internal matters as well. Our work is cut out for us.
Nation building is an integral aspect of our national security objectives. Ungoverned territory is extremely dangerous to the interests of the industrialized world. Look at what has become of Somalia, yet the world’s navies are nearly impotent in halting the piracy running rampant in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. We can no longer tolerate lawlessness and chaos in these forgotten lands. If we do, then we’d better be prepared for another 9/11; the next horrific attack will originate from the minds of zealots safely ensconced in these lawless lands.
We have to redouble our efforts to get Afghanistan up on its feet. It will never be a beacon of light in Central Asia, but as long as it can hold its own against its neighbors and force the local warlords to bow to Kabul’s rule, then we might have a chance to leave with our heads held high. If legitimacy and security are the keystones to successful government, we must entice the Afghans to institute significant reform of its institutions, starting from the top down. We must adequately train police and military forces to do their jobs as well, since without security, the country can never experience capital investment from the world – paved highways, power lines, pipelines, perhaps even railroads – that are so desperately needed to form the framework of a nation. Only then can we enable the Afghans to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations that will root out those who are impeding the reconstruction.
There are those who would stop us though, and they are growing in power every day that we do nothing. First and foremost, we must defang the Taliban. As loathed as they are for providing sanctuary to Al Qaeda before and after 9/11, we must remember that they are not directly responsible for the attacks. They have paid a high price for their indirect participation. In Afghanistan, it is common practice that once an Afghan provides shelter for an outsider, he must defend him from all harm; the Taliban just made a bad choice in sheltering those responsible. If we can bring the Taliban to the peace table and perhaps offer them some say in the future of Afghanistan, then we may see a dramatic decrease in violence in Afghanistan. If we make that offer contingent on the Taliban parting ways with their old houseguests, Al Qaeda, then we may further alienate Al Qaeda’s radical ideology from the Main Street of Islam.
The other troubling aspect to overcome is the reluctance of the various tribes and local warlords to accept national sovereignty. Filled with centuries of hatred for each other, they are not eager to find common ground in Kabul. Furthermore, their concepts of blood feuds, subservient status for women, and other issues complicate the creation of a cohesive nation. Unfortunately, this aspect may be impossible to overcome.
We have to be prepared for a long struggle. The goal posts will seem to move away from us as we painfully advance yard by yard. But we cannot drop the ball if we want to win the game. A turnover in today’s Great Game in Afghanistan could spell disaster, not only for Afghanistan, but also for our own national security as well.
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