- Gen. George S. Patton
Football game days were a huge deal at Texas A&M. As a member of the school’s Corps of Cadets, it was the closest we came to battle. Patriotic music would blare from the open doorways of upperclassmen’s rooms, pumping up the troops for “battle”. The opening monologue from the movie Patton was a favorite motivating tool; by the time we fell outside to form up for the pre-game March-in, our blood was boiling red, white, and blue. We were eager to give all we had for God and country. When Desert Storm broke out, I actually thought about enlisting just to get to the action quicker, but I was less than a year from graduation and commissioning as an officer, so I wisely stayed put.
Americans have always done well in battle. From our earliest experiences in the Revolutionary War to the deserts of Iraq and the lonely windswept peaks and valleys of Afghanistan, Americans have reveled on the field of battle. The names of the battlefields are etched in reverent memory: Bunker Hill, Lexington, New Orleans, Veracruz, Antietam, Gettysburg, San Juan Hill, St. Mihiel, the Argonne, Sicily, Normandy, the Bulge, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Inchon, Khe Sanh, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Iraq. We rarely lose battles; we have perfected the American Way of Warfare – win big, win fast, and lose the fewest casualties. We like the newest weapons, lots of firepower, and we like to meet our adversaries in classic force-on-force battles. We often glorify battle, on the big screen and on Main Street. It is our national pastime, the gridiron classic taken to the next level.
In military circles, there is even a name for the infatuation with battle: operational art. Simply put, operational art is the use of military forces to obtain strategic goals through the planning and execution of battles and engagements into campaigns and major operations. There is really only one problem with the concept of operational art: it lacks a true strategic focus.
According to Webster’s Dictionary, strategy is defined as "the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war" (Emphasis added). Operational art views military force in isolation from the other instruments of national power. The reality of warfare is that all instruments must be brought to bear against an adversary, not just the military one. The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means, meaning that when diplomacy fails to achieve a solution, the reins of power are handed over the military to enforce a solution. And Clausewitz has long been revered in American military circles.
The strategic link in American politics is broken. The military should never operate in isolation from the other instruments of power, even during open warfare. Diplomatic, financial, economic, and other tools should be used in concert with military action to terminate hostilities at the earliest possibility on terms favorable to the national security objectives. If we annihilate the enemy on the field of battle, as in Iraq, there will be nobody to negotiate the terms of peace. And if we have no post-conflict plan for reconstruction, as in Iraq, we must start from the ground up to transform a conquered nation into a stable, functioning member of the family of nations.
In Vietnam, as in Iraq, we won every battle. Yet in Vietnam, we lost the war. During an exchange with a Vietnamese officer long after the war, an American officer pointed out that we had never been beaten on the battlefield. The Viet Cong had ceased to exist as a functional fighting organization and the North Vietnamese Army had been beaten so badly that it took two years after our withdrawal for them to ride into Saigon triumphantly. The NVA officer replied, “That may be true. It is also irrelevant.”
It turns out that the military has never won a war. The military wins battles; national strategy wins wars, even the granddaddy of American wars, World War II. If we had not followed up hostilities in Germany and Japan with an appropriate political solution, such as the Marshall Plan in Europe, we may have met on the battlefield again. After all, the failure of politics to secure the peace after World War I led to a redo 20 years later. If we screw up the follow through, we lose the war. And we are in grave danger of seeing history repeat itself; Iraq and Afghanistan may imitate Vietnam if we do not put the wheels back on the cart.
We cannot afford to lose Iraq and Afghanistan. Any politician that advocates for a quick withdrawal are either grandstanding for their constituents or don’t really understand the nature of the conflict. (And despite campaign promises to withdraw, President Obama is in no rush to act on that pledge). If we pull out, both countries will fall into a downward spiral of chaos and strife leading to regional instability that will eventually draw its neighbors into the abyss as well. And we will get the blame for it. Think we got a hard time from the international community for invading Iraq in the first place? Just wait until it is hell on earth and see how we get treated. After all, we invaded a broken nation and made it worse.
Let’s rebuild the bridge between the military and the other national instruments of power and fix the quagmire before it gets worse. There are solutions out there that don't involve more troops and an untold pot of taxpayer money. But these solutions will take time. I’ll attempt to detail some possible solutions for both Iraq and Afghanistan over the next few postings.